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Lester Ross and Kenneth Zhou

Abstract

Trading and distribution rights were major issues in the negotiation of China’s
entry to the World Trade Organisation, a process which took 14 years before concluding in late 2001. Trading rights, i.e. the right to import and export goods, had
historically been mainly restricted to a small number of largely sector-specific
state-owned monopoly trading enterprises. Trading rights were modestly liberalised in the years preceding China’s entry, but generally remained tightly restricted.
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Trading and
distribution in China
Lester Ross and Kenneth Zhou
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Trading and distribution rights were major issues in the negotiation
of China’s entry to the World Trade Organisation, a process which
took 14 years before concluding in late 2001. Trading rights, ie the
right to import and export goods, had historically been mainly
restricted to a small number of largely sector-specific state-owned
monopoly trading enterprises. Trading rights were modestly liberalised in the years preceding China’s entry, but generally remained
tightly restricted.
Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), ie enterprises established by
foreign investors in China (wholly foreign-owned enterprises
(WFOEs) or joint ventures) were permitted to import raw materials
and semi-manufactures for their own use and to export self-manufactured products directly. In this sense, FIEs were advantaged relative to most domestically-owned enterprises. However, FIEs generally
were not permitted to trade in other products, including products
manufactured by their parents and affiliates, causing inefficiencies
by compelling the use of oligopolistic trading intermediaries. A small
number of minority foreign-owned joint venture trading companies
were established with special approval on an experimental basis,1
but high capital and business volume preconditions coupled with
ceilings on foreign ownership limited their attractiveness. Moreover,
trading in a number of commodities was restricted to authorised
state-owned enterprises because of strategic or commercial considerations. The principal exception involved China’s free trade or
bonded zones like Waigaoqiao in Shanghai, where wholly foreignowned trading companies were permitted because they operated outside China’s customs territory. Thus, they could legally import
products into China’s domestic markets through transactions mediated by commodities exchanges or other authorised trading agents.
A similar situation applied to distribution, ie the procurement
and sale of products (wholesale and/or retail) on the domestic market. FIEs were permitted to procure components and raw materials
on the China market for their own use and to sell their self-manufactured products in China, although they contractually agreed in
some instances to allow their Chinese joint venturer to perform such
functions. They were not, however, permitted to purchase or sell
other products, including products manufactured by their parents or
affiliates. This resulted in duplication of procurement and distribution systems as multinationals were compelled to establish separate
systems for products manufactured in China and imported products,
even if they were sold under the same brand. Alternatively, they could
import products in semi-manufactured form for final processing in
China, but this too was not necessarily efficient. Large multinationals which had established China-based investment or holding companies for their investments in China (hold cos) were eventually given
the right to distribute products imported from their parents and affiliates, as well as by their investee FIEs, but the high registered capital threshold to establish a hold co excluded most foreign investors.
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China’s WTO commitments
China, as a condition to its WTO accession, committed to gradually
grant trading rights to all enterprises in China within three years of
accession, ie by 11 December 2004, except for certain goods which
continued to be subject to state trading. All such goods were to be
accorded national treatment with respect to their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, including
their direct access to end-users.2
China also committed to gradually open distribution to foreign
service suppliers, including WFOEs, by 11 December 2004, except
for the wholesaling of chemical fertilisers, processed oil and crude
oil and the retailing of chemical fertilisers, for which full liberalisation was not required until 11 December 2006. China also committed to fully liberalise franchising and trade services away from a fixed
location, ie direct selling, by 11 December 2004.3
Taken together, these commitments, subject to limited exceptions, promised to completely remove barriers to market entry with
respect to trading and distribution. These reforms could be expected
to enhance efficiency and consumer welfare in general, while also
increasing the availability of imported goods.

China’s implementation of its WTO commitments
Trading
In early 2003, China allowed foreign investors to establish joint ventures specialising in import and export for an approved range of
products.4 Unlike ordinary FIEs, approved joint ventures were permitted to conduct foreign trade business either as part of their ordinary business or on a commission basis, without restriction to
self-manufactured products. This reform in several respects constituted only a partial implementation of China’s commitment to liberalise trading. First, WFOEs were not yet authorised. Second,
market entry was impeded by a very high registered capital threshold, set first at RMB100 million before being lowered to a still quite
high RMB50 million, an amount much higher than that required for
domestic companies. Third, joint venturers were required to have
substantial trade experience. Both foreign and Chinese investors were
required to have engaged in foreign trade with an average annual
trade volume of at least US$300 million over the preceding three
years, and the Chinese joint venturer was required to have its own
foreign trade rights. This latter requirement meant that foreign
investors were compelled to partner with competitors without assurance that the joint venture would endure. Not surprisingly, few such
joint ventures were established. As noted above, WFOE trading companies were permitted only in China’s free trade zones. Moreover,
hold cos were permitted to imported products of their parent company in limited quantities to seed or test the market. Hold cos based
in Beijing or Shanghai upgraded to regional headquarters pursuant
to municipal regulations were also eligible for the right to import
their parent company’s products for domestic sale without quanti-
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tative restriction as of 1999 and 2002, respectively. Approved foreign-invested research and development centres were also entitled to
import equipment, technology and spare parts for their own use, and
also to import products from their parent companies to be developed
for the local market and to test or seed the market.
By mid-2004, China fulfilled its WTO commitment—in advance
of the deadline. Under amendments to the Foreign Trade Law
enacted on 6 April 2004 and the Measures on Registration of Foreign Trade Operators (Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 25 June
2004), all domestic and foreign enterprises and natural persons were
made eligible for full trading rights as of 1 July 2004.
Under the new procedures, the requirement to establish a specialised trading company was dispensed with and eligibility for trading rights was made available without the need to establish a
specialised trading company. WFOEs were eligible for trading rights
to the same extent as any other enterprise. Moreover, the former registered capital and experience requirements no longer applied. So
long as the applicant satisfied minimum registered capital requirements for the establishment of a business entity—RMB100,000
under the Company Law, with higher minima in different localities
based on the scope of business—an applicant would be eligible for
trading rights regardless of its investors’ prior experience.
Distribution rights
In contrast to trading rights for which China fulfilled its WTO commitments in advance, China has yet to completely fulfil its commitments with respect to distribution rights. As a result, the barriers to
market entry have been only partially lifted, so competition remains
more limited. Moreover, some restrictions have been imposed with
respect to particular sectors.

FIEs were permitted to engage in distribution, their eligibility for continued enjoyment of such tax holiday is unclear. Compliance with
the customs goods classification and coding system presents a more
technical issue with respect to non-self-manufactured products
imported by FIEs for domestic distribution.
MOFCOM, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and the
General Administration of Customs (GAC) have held multiple meetings to discuss the above issues and reached consensus only recently.
In the future, any manufacturing FIE applying for distribution rights
must elect, by completing a one-page declaration form, whether it
wishes to remain a manufacturing FIE or become a distribution FIE.
If it chooses to remain a manufacturing FIE its revenue generated
from distributing non-self-manufactured products must not exceed
30 per cent of its total distribution revenue (including both self-manufactured and non-self-manufactured products). Once a manufacturing FIE elects to be a distribution FIE, it will no longer enjoy the
tax holiday and will have to pay full income tax on all its future revenue, including revenue generated from selling self-manufactured
products. There are other requirements imposed by MOFCOM for
a manufacturing FIE to obtain distribution rights, eg, goods to be
distributed must be in the same category as self-manufactured goods.
With the promulgation of the above requirements, MOFCOM has
committed to process applications for expansion of business scope
for existing FIEs beginning in March 2005. However, the eligibility
of trading FIEs in bonded zones to gain distribution rights remains
unclear because such zones have different customs supervision and
tax policies. On the whole, MOFCOM seems to encourage foreign
investors to establish greenfield distribution FIEs as opposed to
expanding the scope of business of existing FIEs to include distribution rights.

Governing regulations
Prior to WTO accession, foreign investment in the wholesale and
retail sectors was governed by the Foreign-Invested Commercial
Enterprise Pilot Measures (MOFCOM 1999). Under the Pilot Measures, foreign investors could establish wholesale or retail enterprises
only in the form of joint ventures; WFOEs were not permitted. Foreign investors were subject to substantial experience and capitalisation thresholds. Thus, while the Pilot Measures opened the door to
foreign investment in the wholesale and retail sectors, WFOEs were
prohibited and high market entry barriers were imposed.
In conjunction with the 6 April 2004 amendments to the Foreign Trade Law, China moved to fulfill its WTO commitments by
replacing the Pilot Measures with the Administrative Measures on
Foreign Investment in the Commercial Sector (the ‘Administrative
Measures’, MOFCOM 16 April 2004 with effect from 1 July 2004).
The Administrative Measures marked substantial progress by authorizing the establishment of WFOEs as well as joint ventures. The
experience and size thresholds were deleted. The high and discriminatory registered capital minima were deleted, replaced by the minima applicable to domestic enterprises under the Company Law
(RMB500,000 for wholesale, RMB300,000 for retail).
In addition to establishment of greenfield distribution companies, the Administrative Measures also permit existing FIEs to
expand their scopes of business to include distribution rights. In practice, while MOFCOM has approved dozens of greenfield distribution FIEs since the promulgation of the Administrative Measures,
existing FIEs (particularly manufacturing FIEs) have yet to be permitted to expand their scopes of business to include distribution
rights because of delays in resolving such existing FIEs’ tax status
and compliance with the customs goods classification and coding
system. Manufacturing FIEs generally enjoy a tax holiday (two-year
exemption and three-year 50 per cent reduction in enterprise income
tax) for which most services FIEs are not eligible. If manufacturing

Franchising
MOFCOM promulgated the Administrative Measures on Commercial Franchise Business (the Franchise Measures) on 31 December 2004, effective 1 February 2005. The Franchise Measures
replaced the Interim Measures for Administration of Commercial
Franchise Operations (1997, the Interim Measures) which only
applied to Chinese domestic franchisers. The Franchise Measures
also superseded the draft Provisional Measures on Administration
of FIEs Engaging in Commercial Franchising Business (the Provisional Measures), issued by MOFCOM for comment in November
2004, which were to have applied to foreign franchisers conducting
franchise business through FIEs. The promulgation of the Franchise
Measures represents China’s implementation of its commitments
under the WTO5 with respect to elimination of legal restrictions on
foreign investment in China’s franchising businesses by 11 December 2004.
Franchising is defined in the Franchise Measures as a contractual relationship where a franchiser grants a franchisee the right to
use its business resources, such as trademark, trade name and business model, and the franchisee operates under a uniform operating
system and pays a franchise fee in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the franchise agreement.
The Franchise Measures set out two franchise models: (i) the
franchiser directly grants the franchise right to the franchisee and the
latter invests to establish franchise stores and networks to engage in
business without the right to sub-franchise; and (ii) the franchiser
grants to the franchisee the exclusive franchise right for a designated
territory, and the franchisee can sub-franchise to third parties and/or
directly invest to establish a franchising network in the territory.
A franchiser must satisfy the following conditions: (i) be a lawfully established enterprise or other economic organisation, (ii) possess economic resources (trademark, trade name and business model)
which it has the right to license for use by the franchisee, (iii) have
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the capacity to provide long-term guidance and training to the franchisee, (iv) it or its subsidiary or parent have at least two directly
operated stores in China with at least one year’s operating experience, (v) if the franchise business requires the franchiser to supply
goods, have a stable and quality-guaranteed goods supply system
and be able to provide ancillary services, and (vi) have a sound business reputation and not have engaged in any fraudulent activities
with respect to franchising. There are no specific requirements with
respect to the qualifications of the franchisee, as long as it is a legally
established entity and has the necessary funds, fixed locations and
personnel to engage in a franchised business.
A franchiser under the Franchise Measures is entitled to receive
franchise fees and a deposit. ‘Franchise fees’ include a membership
fee (one-time fee paid by the franchisee to obtain franchise rights),
royalties (regular fees paid during the term of the franchise calculated on the basis of a predetermined standard or a certain percentage of revenue), and other fees (fees paid for the goods or services
supplied in connection with the franchise in accordance with the
franchise agreement). ‘Deposit’ refers to a payment made by the franchisee to guarantee its performance of the franchise agreement, which
is refundable after the expiration of the franchise agreement.
A franchiser is also required under the Franchise Measures to
assume certain disclosure obligations. Such disclosure obligations
includes the franchiser’s name, address, capital, business model and
scope of business, legal proceedings, registration status of the relevant trademarks, number of other franchisees, their locations and
business circumstances, investment budget for franchise networks,
general description of the franchiser’s management, as well as other
information requested by the franchisee. Note that “disclosing any
information requested by the franchisee” is open-ended and potentially burdensome.
To many foreign companies’ surprise, the Franchise Measures
included a new provision compared to the Provisional Measures,
requiring all companies intending to conduct franchise business in
China to have established, directly or through their subsidiaries or
parents, at least two directly-operated stores in China with at least
one year’s operating experience. This provision caused serious concern because it constitutes an additional market entry barrier and is
seemingly inconsistent with a pure franchise model. We learned from
MOFCOM that it added this provision to deter fraudulent activities.
In MOFCOM’s view, requiring franchisers to establish commercial
presences in China makes it easier to regulate the franchise market
and penalise violations. We also learned that the State Council and
MOFCOM are now in the process of drafting another rule directed
against fraudulent and other illegal activities relating to franchising.
With respect to how a foreign franchiser without a commercial
presence can qualify to do business in China, MOFCOM’s initial
response was that such foreign franchiser must first apply for establishment of a foreign-invested commercial enterprise (FICE) in China,
in accordance with the Administrative Measures. The FICE must
have at least two ‘direct operating stores’ funded and managed
directly by the FICE to qualify as a franchiser under the Franchise
Measures. After one year of operation, the FICE may apply for the
right to conduct a franchising business under the Franchise Regulations. In many foreign franchisers’ view, the new provision, if implemented, will impede market entry compared to their Chinese
counterparts.
The Franchise Measures provide a grace period for FIEs engaged
in franchising business prior to the promulgation of the Franchise
Measures. These FIEs must file for the record with MOFCOM and
must comply with the Franchise Measures going forward, including
the two stores requirement. If so, many existing franchising FIEs may
be forced to delay expansion until they have satisfied the two stores,
one-year operating experience requirement.
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Direct selling
Direct selling in the form of multi-tier selling arrived in China in the
early 1990s and expanded very quickly, but proved to be very controversial.6 There were many abuses in the form of pyramid sales
with naïve recruits paying substantial initiation fees and/or purchasing substantial quantities of goods with limited sales prospects.
The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and
ultimately the State Council became alarmed at the threat to social
stability and promulgated regulations prohibiting such sales operations. Such operations also have a political dimension in China, as
they bind together large numbers of citizens in organisations outside
the control of the Communist Party and security organs.
Ten direct selling FIEs operating prior to the crackdown on direct
selling were allowed to continue in business. They were required,
however, to replace the system of sales by representatives away from
fixed locations, a cardinal feature of direct selling, with sales from
fixed locations predicated on a minimum number of locations in each
provincial-level jurisdiction where they operate.
China’s commitment under the WTO to allow sales without
fixed locations is thus inconsistent with the abhorrence by security
organs, as well as protectionist forces, for large autonomous organisations of sales representatives. This contradiction, including a lack
of consensus on the distinction between prohibited pyramid sales
(chuanxiao) and direct sales (zhixiao), and disagreements between
MOFCOM—which has been relatively welcoming toward foreign
investment and supportive of compliance with WTO obligations,
and SAIC—which tends to be more protectionist towards domestic
industry, has delayed the promulgation of regulations governing
direct selling and authorising market entry by late entrants. Specific
details regarding the requirement for fixed locations, recruitment
requirements for sales representatives, registered capital thresholds,
and the range of goods that enterprises may be approved to sell are
critical unresolved issues. However, failure to honour its WTO commitments may render China vulnerable under the WTO’s dispute resolution procedures.
The Administrative Measures include a restriction on foreigninvested retail enterprises with anti-competitive implications. First,
all stores must conform to the municipal master plan and the municipality’s requirements for commercial development. This creates a
potential for discrimination against larger stores, in favour of smaller
stores. Second, applicants must provide additional documents governing land use rights for larger stores, ie stores larger than 3,000 sq
metres. Third, all applications to establish such enterprises require
MOFCOM approval unless they are below specific size thresholds,
in which case approval authority may be delegated to the provinciallevel commerce authority which results in a simpler and faster
approval process than ministerial approval. Applicants are eligible
for provincial-level approval if (i) there will be no more than three
stores in the province, the area of each store is less than 3,000 sq
metres, and the maximum number of stores established in China by
the foreign investor is 30; or (ii) there will be no more than 30 stores
in the province, the area of each store is less than 300 sq metres, and
the maximum number of the same type of store established in China
by the foreign investor is 300. These provisions have the effect of
restricting the establishment of larger stores and chain stores by FIEs,
and are discriminatory because domestic enterprises are not subject
to comparable restrictions.

Other competition regulations
Anti-monopoly
Historically, China had no need for anti-monopoly or antitrust regulations because the industrial and commercial sectors were largely
state-owned, in part precisely to pursue the presumptive benefits of
monopolies and monopsonies. As the economy was liberalised, the
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perceived need for competition regulation grew. An anti-monopoly
law is under active consideration but has yet to be enacted. However, transactions by foreign entities or involving FIEs may be subject to reporting obligations under the Interim Provisions on Mergers
and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(MOFCOM and SAIC, 7 March 2003). The Interim Provisions
under Article 3 are targeted against transactions that “cause excessive concentration, eliminate or restrict competition, disrupt the
social and economic order or damage the interests of society and the
public”. Transactions involving FIEs must be reported for review if
a party has operational revenues in the Chinese market of RMB1.5
billion or more, more than 10 domestic enterprises in the industry
have been subject to a transaction in the year, or a party’s existing
market share is 20 per cent or more before the transaction or will
increase to 25 per cent or more as a result of the transaction. Even
overseas transactions are subject to such requirements if a party has
assets in China of RMB3 billion or more, has operational revenues
in the Chinese market of RMB1.5 billion or more, a party’s existing
market share is 20 per cent or more before the transaction or will
increase to 25 per cent or more as a result of the transaction, or the
transaction will result in a party having direct or indirect equity interests in more than 15 FIEs in the same domestic industry.
We are not aware of any transactions having been modified or
rejected during such review, but the review is discriminatory as no
comparable burden applies to transactions between domestic parties. The Interim Provisions can, however, impede expansion by foreign investors in the trading and distribution industries, particularly
if markets are defined narrowly on the basis of particular products
or geographies.

Competition behaviour
The Law Against Unfair Competition (1993), which is pending
amendment, under Article 11 prohibits the sale of commodities
below cost for the purpose of eliminating competition except under
certain special circumstances: perishable commodities, clearance of
overstocks or of inventory nearing expiration of the sales validity
period, seasonal price reductions, and sales to reduce debt, occasioned by a change in business lines, or business closure. Tie-ins are
also prohibited, as is the importation of unreasonable conditions on
purchasers under Article 15. Similarly, the Law on the Protection of
the Rights and Interests of Consumers (1993), under Article 9, provides consumers with the freedom of choice among business operators with respect to the provision of commodities or services,
including whether or not to make a purchase. Article 10 also provides consumers with the right to reject transactions compelled by
business operators.
Thus, businesses engaged in trading and distribution must not
engage in tie-ins and must not engage in domestic dumping, particularly if the purpose can be construed as intended to drive out competitors. These regulations are presumably of greater concern to
larger business operators with pricing power.
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